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McCrackin: Miscellaneous
MISCELLANEOUS
E. WINDELL MCCFACKIN*

Attachments
Our Supreme Court held in Brewer v. Graydon' that realty
belonging to a nonresident could not be attached in actions for
alienation of affections or criminal conversation. It refused
to overrule Addison v. Sigette,2 stating that had the General
Assembly desired to allow attachments in such cases, it could
have so provided as it did pertaining to libel and slander
actions.
In SoutheasternEquipment Co. v. One 1954 Autocar Diesel
Tractor3 plaintiff commenced an action by issuing a summons
against the defendant, a foreign corporation, and attached
a tractor, property of the defendant. Thereafter the defendant
appeared specially for the purpose of substitution of security
which was granted. Then defendant served upon plaintiff's
counsel a motion to dissolve the attachment for defects and
wrote plaintiff's counsel demanding a copy of the complaint
subject to the motion to dissolve the attachment. Immediately
thereafter, defendant's counsel served an additional notice
on plaintiff's counsel in which it sought to qualify the notice
of motion to dissolve the attachment and the letter demanding
a copy of the complaint as being subject to special appearance.
About 20 days later a copy of the complaint was served
upon defendant's counsel who acknowledged it. Later a motion was made by defendant to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that more than 30 days had elapsed since the issuance
of the summons, but that no personal service thereof had been
made upon it, and no publication thereof commenced.
By order of the lower court, the complaint as to the defendant was dismissed for lack of service of the summons, and
the tractor substituted as party defendant. The court refused
to dissolve the attachment. On appeal by both parties, the
Court concluded that the acts stated above did not comply with
*Attorney at Law, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina.

1. 233 S. C. 124, 103 S. E. 2d 767 (1958).
2. 50 S. C. 192, 27 S. E. 631 (1897).
3. 234 S. C. 213, 107 S. E. 2d 340 (1959).
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Section 10-64S4 and that the defendant had subjected itself
to the jurisdiction of the court.
It was held that the order refusing to dissolve the attachment must be affirmed inasmuch as the motion was made
after "substitution of security" which was too late. Such act
constituted implied acknowledgement of the validity of the
attachment.
Wrongful Death-

Beneficiary Thereof

Again the Court reaffirmed its prior decisions in deciding
that when a preferred beneficiary under Section 10-1952 of
the 1952 Code died before action was commenced, the action
shall be for the benefit of the next remoter class of beneficiaries rather than for the estate or heirs at law of the
preferred beneficiary. 5 The Court recognized that South Carolina was not in line with the apparent majority view, but it
refused to overturn its previous much deliberated decisions. 6
Actions
In Stewart v. Martin, et al.7 the Court was called upon to
decide an hitherto open question. Plaintiff brought an action
alleging that defendants had committed tortious acts in preventing the sheriff from seizing an automobile subject to attachment for damages allegedly received in a collision therewith. Defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground
that it "did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action in that it did not appear that there had been any adjudication that the alleged damage to plaintiff's taxicab was
caused by the negligent operation of the Chevrolet, or any
judicial determination that plaintiff had a lien thereon."
The lower court sustained the demurrer, and construed the
complaint as being an action for conversion. On appeal the
Supreme Court held that the action was to recover damages
resulting from the wrongful and malicious acts of the defendants in removing and secreting the automobile, thereby preventing the sheriff from seizing it under the attachment
papers. It went on to hold that such an action was maintainable in South Carolina.
4. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952.

5. Rushton v. Smith, 233 S. C. 292, 104 S. E. 2d 376 (1958).
6. Morris v. Spartanburg Ry., Gas & Electric Co., 70 S. C. 279, 49

S. E. 854 (1904) ; and Elkin v. Southern Ry., 156 S. C. 390, 153 S. E. 337

(1930).

7. 232 S. C. 483, 102 S. E. 2d 886 (1958).
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Recognition was given to the fact that most courts do not
allow such actions by a general creditor. However, it pointed
out that by statute8 any person injured by the negligent
operation of an automobile has an interest or right superior to
a general creditor. Even though the right may be inchoate or
contingent, the owner of such right has a special interest in
the property - namely, security interest for the payment of
any judgment which may be awarded.
The Court quite accurately pointed out also the injustice
which could result if such an action were not maintainable. In
situations in which the owner or driver of an automobile could
not be ascertained, the injured party would be without a remedy because in an in rem action the res must be brought before
the court before judgment can be obtained.
Elections
Two cases arose during this period involving contested
political elections. In the first 9 the petitioner alleged that
the candidate certified by the Board of State Canvassers as
the winner in the General Election of 1958 had not complied
with Section 23-265 of the 1952 Code which requires candidates to make certain pledges. In addition the expenditure
statement mentioned in the pledge must be filed before and
after the election. The winner filed such a pledge on June 9,
1958, on June 23, 1958, on June 25, 1958, on November 4,
1958, at about noon, and on November 8, 1958. He filed Expenditure Statements on June 9, 1958, on June 11, 1958, on
June 23, 1958, on June 25, 1958, on November 4, 1958, and
on November 8, 1958.
The Court stated that it clearly appeared that compliance
with the statute had been effected as to the primary elections.
Such is certainly evident by referring to the dates set forth
above and by keeping in mind that the primary elections were
held on June 10, and June 24, 1958.
The pledge filed by the winner on June 25, 1958, was held
to be prospective and was sufficient compliance with the
statute for the general election. Concerning the statements of
expenditures pertaining to the general election, the Court held
that the statement filed on November 9, 1958, substantially
8. CODE oF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 45-551.

9. Lovelle v. Thornton, 234 S. 0. 21, 106 S. E. 2d 531 (1959).
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complied with the statute. Inasmuch as the statement filed
about noon on November 4, 1958, showed that no expenditures
had been made, the Court further held that filing the statement on election day was not fatal. The Court after pointing
out that the provisions of the statute relating to the time of
filing are directory rather than mandatory, stated:
We should not, because of a merely technical failure to
comply with a directory provision of the statute, deny
to the successful candidate the fruits of his victory, or
to the voters the officer of their choice.
In the second case'0 ex-judge Redfearn, who has been much
in the news during the last year, sought to nullify the certification of a write-in candidate as the winner of the 1958
general election for the office of Probate Judge for Chesterfield County.
Of the 119 ballots contested by Redfearn, the voter had
placed an "X" or a check mark in the circle under the word
"Democrat" on the ballot. On 97 of these Redfearn's name
was scratched out and in the column to the right of it, other
names were written in. On the remaining 21 ballots, Redfearn's name had not been scratched out, but other names had
been written in opposite the name of the office.
Section 23-310 of the 1952 Code was held to be directory and
not inflexible, and Section 23-357 specifically allows a voter
to vote for any qualified person whose name is not on the
ballot by "writing in the name of the person opposite the
office." The election statutes do not require a voter to go
further and strike out the name printed on the ballot; neither
do they proscribe the counting of a ballot for a write-in candidate when the voter has also marked the party circle. The
intent of the voter is of primary importance in deciding contested ballots, and such intent will control in the absence of
the violation of positive requirements of law. The Court refused to upset the action of the State Board of Canvassers.
Estoppel by Jugment

Mackey v. Frazier" was an action by the owner and operator of an automobile against the driver of a truck involved in
a collision with the automobile. The owner of the truck had
10. Redfearn v. Board of State Canvassers of South Carolina, 234

S. C. 113, 107 S. E. 2d 10 (1959).
11. 234 S. C. 81, 106 S. E. 2d 895 (1959).
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previously sued Mackey for damages arising out of the collision. Mackey counterclaimed in that action, alleging negligence and willfulness on the part of Frazier as servant and
agent of the truck's owner. Mackey also set up a general denial and defenses of sole and contributory negligence on the
part of Frazier as operator of the truck. In said action the
owner of the truck had judgment against Mackey for the
damages sustained. The acts alleged in the present case were
verbatim the same as those set forth in the counterclaim in
the first action. The defendant herein set up as a defense
the former adjudication and moved for judgment on the
pleadings.
The question thus presented to the Court was: Can one who
sues the master for personal injury caused by the sole negligence of the servant and having failed in such action, maintain another action against the servant alleging the same acts
of negligence as the proximate cause of his injury and damage?
After referring to several cases from other jurisdictions,
the Court held that the facts of the instant case constituted
estoppel by judgment and was a complete bar to the action.
However, the Court specifically refused to hold that the prior
case was res judicata, because the parties to the actions were
not the same. To the writer, the decision seems eminently
correct.
Duty of Innkeeper to Guests
The court of appeals for the Fourth Circuit in deciding
Bowling v. Lewis 12 held that an innkeeper in South Carolina
owes to his guests, at the least, the duty of exercising ordinary or reasonable care to maintain those parts of his premises which a guest may be expected to use, in a reasonably
safe condition. Judge Wyche's order granting an involuntary
dismissal was reversed, the Court having concluded from the
facts of the case that there was sufficient evidence to go to
the jury.

12. 261 P. 2d S11 (4th Cir. 1958).
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